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Sahana Udupa
The increasingly complex and elusive media landscape 
has thrown fresh challenges to an unsettled ecosystem 
of media policy in India. This paper traces some of the 
challenges posed by the new communications 
technologies and the variegated field of media practices 
to argue that the fragmented media policy framework 
requires a complete makeover in terms of its regulatory 
objectives, strategies and public media obligations. 
Emphasising the need for incorporating anthropological 
and technologically informed perspectives on the 
nature and implications of current media expansion, the 
paper proposes that the policy framework should 
include a modular and unbundled approach to media 
regulation. Policymakers should also invest research 
energy into the exercise of mapping the diversity of 
media practices and multiple logics driving rapid 
proliferation of media across the country. In the context 
of growing state practices of surveillance and staggered 
acquiescence to corporate interests, policy interventions 
should move beyond the contradictory impulses of 
“policing” the media and media-enabled development 
to craft innovative ways of leveraging the benefits of 
current media architecture as well as several recent  
legal provisions aimed at enhancing the capacity of 
public information. 
A suicide attempt by a minor in Bangalore following his t elevision-inspired curiosity to “check” the consequences  of hanging has reminded us again on the potential harm 
of unregulated scheduling of television programmes in the bur-
geoning private media in India. Concerns have been raised over 
the discordant, if not completely dysfunctional media policy of 
the Indian state, which has attracted sharp criticisms for failing 
to meet even the basic objectives of content regulation concern-
ing minor protection. If content regulation is the most visible ele-
ment of regulation, the increasingly complex and elusive media 
landscape has thrown fresh challenges to an unsettled ecosystem 
of media policy in India. On the one hand, advanced communica-
tions technologies have unleashed a new rush for spectrum, in-
spiring and enabling multifarious ways to co-opt the labyrinths 
of internet and convergence architectures. The debate over multi-
casting technologies that could benefit all content providers ver-
sus proprietary forms of content-catching benefiting capital 
heavy private players is the latest case in point. On the other 
hand, the spread and reach of conventional media such as the 
print and broadcasting have proceeded at an even more acceler-
ated pace of expansion. The two critical aspects of media – car-
riage and content – are thus more intricately laid out before the 
policymakers than in the earlier phase of having to deal only with 
bundled communications technologies such as broadcasting. 
At first glance, heated discussions around the ways to draw 
democratic benefits from internet-enabled media spaces appear 
quite futile in a country like India with internet penetration as 
low as 8%. However, the impact of new communications tech-
nologies is more widespread than what this statistic can reveal. 
Advanced communications technologies have fundamentally al-
tered the ways in which information and meanings are delivered, 
organised and received. They have, for example, increasingly 
blurred the boundaries between content givers, carriers and dis-
tributors – a trend often captured in the phrase “convergence 
technologies”. Akin to the countries in the west, India is not far 
behind in embracing these new technologies. With 246 million 
mobile phone connections in 2008, India is one of the largest 
m obile phone markets in the world. According to Media Partners 
Asia, the subscriber base for DTH television in India is slated to 
increase from 17 million in 2009 to 45 million in 2014, overtaking 
the United States (US) by 2012. The same report forecasts digital 
cable to grow to 17 million subscribers, and cable broadband to 
three million household subscriptions by 2014. 
Conventional media such as the print has witnessed an explo-
sive growth in the last two decades, while private television has 
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rapidly proliferated across the country. Between 1995 and 2007, 
more than 300 satellite networks entered the Indian market. 
While many of them provided a variety of entertainment content, 
there was also a rapid expansion of the news media. More than 
50 of the satellite networks were 24-hour satellite news channels, 
broadcasting news in 11 different languages (Mehta 2008). In 
contrast to the shrinking print news markets in the west, news 
media in India has expanded across platforms, regions and lan-
guages. With a total of 325 million readers, India’s newspaper in-
dustry generated Rs 172 billion ($3.8 billion) in sales in 2010, ac-
cording to the World Association of Newspapers. KPMG estimates 
that this figure is set to rise by 9% per year over the next four 
years to Rs 267 billion ($5.9 billion) (Pagnamenta 2011). Circula-
tion of leading newspapers has been on a steady rise, even as 
several niche papers continue to explore and capture new market 
segments. According to the World Newspaper Congress held in 
H yderabad in 2009, India has more daily newspapers than any 
other nation and leads in paid-for daily circulation, surpassing 
China for the first time in 2008. Twenty of the world’s 100 largest 
newspapers are Indian. Television channels and newspapers are 
thus multiplying, alongside new forms of media such as video-
on-demand, video games, digital media and social media which 
are slowly, yet surely, expanding. 
In the context of rapid expansion of multiple media forms, 
p olicy debates should adopt a multi-pronged approach towards 
analysing and drawing benefits from the complex media archi-
tecture. This involves simultaneous attention to conventional 
media and new media, and the diverse ways through which they 
co-constitute publics and politics. This article seeks to take a step 
in this direction, beginning with an outline of the nature of 
m ediatisation underway in India today followed by a brief discus-
sion of the media policy paradigms which have shaped state- 
media relations in the post-independence years. Following these 
regulatory concerns, the article argues that the policy framework 
should adopt a technologically and anthropologically informed 
approach to the media. It proceeds to propose and elaborate 
three policy imperatives in the subsequent sections – the need for 
mapping diverse news fields within India; the reimagining and 
revival of public media systems; and the regulatory models suit-
able for the private media. While each of these interlinked 
strands of policy debate is significant in addressing the existing 
policy gaps, they are by no means exhaustive. Instead, the article 
hopes to flag them as ways of drawing attention to the increas-
ingly complex media landscapes of India and re-emphasise the 
need to initiate a wider public debate on the issue. 
1 ‘Massification’ and Visibility
While there are different vantage points to approach and analyse 
the nature of current media expansion, two interlinked pheno-
mena stand out significantly. Massification and visibility are two 
aspects of the recent media expansion in India, which have 
t ogether marked a shift from the earlier phase of state-led media 
agendas fed by the mutually constitutive ideas of modernisation 
and nationalism. There is a certain degree of “massification” of 
media because of the sheer increase in the volume of media audi-
ences and media production. Television and new media outlets 
(including small-sized newspapers, cable television, pirated 
video and new media) have extended the reach of the public 
d omain to include more people and sections of people than in the 
earlier phases. In this sense, the media has clearly come out of an 
elite model of media production in the colonial and post- 
independence period; all the more so because of the widespread 
pirate culture in which thousands of fakes of media products 
“clandestinely” circulate the market. This massification or 
w idening of mediated public space is distinct from what the 
F rankfurt School derided as the “culture industry”. It would be 
an overstatement to propose that the deluge of media images 
has turned the Indian audience into a passive, consuming, 
homo geneous, uncritical, overwhelmed “mass”, or transformed 
prekshakaru (viewers) into jana (people) under the aegis of 
c ulture industry.
There are at least two observations that support this claim. 
First, there is the sheer heterogeneity of the audience and cul-
tural representations circulating in the Indian media. Many 
forms of media and their defined audience groups collide, over-
lap, and distinguish themselves within the networks of media 
production. Both the cultural product and its audience are there-
fore dispersed, fragmented and unavoidably messy. If scores of 
fly-by-night newspapers circulate around Vidhana Soudha (secre-
tariat) to blackmail police officers and titillate gossip-hungry 
government employees, hundreds of cable television networks 
beam the latest Bollywood (pirated) cinema on neighbourhood 
television sets far and away from the power centre. There is also 
the mighty national television network, and even mightier 
r egional language television channels that give a heady cocktail 
of crime, politics and melodrama; smattered with tropes of tradi-
tion and superstition. 
Second, television audiences are not surely and merely uncriti-
cal. While it is difficult to gather evidence to substantiate this 
point, the sheer increase in the number of studio-based debates 
on “current affairs” and other forms of mediated activism point 
to an active middle class citizenry voicing their concerns and 
fighting for justice. This signals new forms of political culture 
emerging on the terrains of television channels and other media 
platforms. In its best manifestation, it has turned audience into 
“demanding” and critical citizens who participate in studio talks 
challenging the politicians; who organise protests to save their 
roads and trees and invite the media to cover the rally; who 
a pproach a television reporter before thinking of lodging a police 
complaint; who lead campaigns on the internet and garner sup-
port worldwide (e g, the pink chaddie campaign). In a profound 
sense, visibility has penetrated governance, making the ruling 
bloc partially (and at times erroneously) accountable to the me-
dia and mediated publics. A striking illustration for this new form 
of mediatised political activism is the rise of the Lokayukta (pub-
lic ombudsman) as a new vanguard of citizen rights against cor-
ruption in Karnataka in south India. The offenders are govern-
ment officials who are laid in traps by the Lokayukta vigilance 
team during the course of accepting bribes from common citi-
zenry. These traps rarely become full-fledged “legal” traps in 
which officials get convicted for their crime and condemned for 
legally sanctioned punishment. Instead, it is a trap of visibility, a 
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trap in which the offender squirms under the raging gaze of the 
media and through the media with innumerable audience watch-
ing. This critical visual trap alludes neither to the Frankfurt 
School’s overwhelmed spectator nor to Kant’s detached aesthete. 
In this, visibility is itself a political practice. At its best, it unfolds 
as an “exposure” and provides the much-needed democratic 
inter vention in governance. At its worst, it is what Walter Ben-
jamin would term as “aestheticised politics” in which the ruling 
bloc “sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but 
instead a chance to express themselves” (2001: 63). Thus, the 
r esult may not necessarily be substantive political change, but 
only public expression and even evacuation of citizen activism 
after a brief period of heightened visibility. The recent Anna 
H azare movement bears out this danger of abbreviated, yet 
i ntense forms of mediated political activism. 
This is also precisely the ambiguity of contemporary media 
production and explosion of affect-intensive spaces of media 
v isibility in India. Simultaneously, against the dizzying backdrop 
of multiple media, the “mainstream” English news entities con-
tinue to be active in cementing the ideologies of market-led 
growth, corporate leadership and “urban boosterism”.1 For any 
meaningful policy and public engagement with the contempo-
rary media, it is imperative to discern the growing dominance of 
mediated visibility in contemporary politics and the commercial 
drives that shape its intended and unintended consequences. 
2 Media Policy Paradigms and Current Conundrums
Alongside the questions of cultural autonomy and purity which 
drove much of regulatory dilemmas for the broadcasting sector 
in the 1970s and 1980s, media regulation is today confronted 
with newer challenges of advanced communication architec-
tures, accelerated privatisation of news, burgeoning media con-
tent and rapidly mutating genres which have blurred the bounda-
ries between information, entertainment, speculation and spirit-
ual pedagogy. The new advancements in communications as well 
as content explosion via multiple channels call into question the 
efficacy of existing policy approaches to media, including the still 
dominant conventional media. 
The multiple regulatory bills introduced in the last decade to 
keep pace with the changing communications technologies and 
media expansion reveal a fragmented framework shaped as 
much by the Indian state’s staggered acquiescence to corporate 
interests as by the entrenched colonial structures of governance 
aimed at “containing” and “reining in” the media. This sits un-
comfortably with the ideology of engaging and employing cer-
tain media technologies, especially the broadcast sector and now 
the internet, to advance state-led developmental goals. The 
m edia policy paradigms in India are thus built on the contradic-
tory impulses of restriction, technology-led development and de-
regulation (Chakravartty 2004; Naregal 2000; Parthasarathy 
2010; Rajagopal 2001), even as several informalised media prac-
tices constantly perforate the policy framework, at times to the 
advantage of many sections of people excluded by the legitimis-
ing discourse of the state. Simultaneously, the commercialisation 
of the news media in particular is increasingly normalised 
through discourses fuelled by the corporate sector which club 
news media and entertainment together as a single business 
c ategory. Industry auditing agencies such as KPMG and Price-
waterhouseCoopers (PwC) assess and predict the financial indi-
cators of what they have christened as “media and entertainment 
sector”, which considers news, cinema, internet, mobile phone 
and other emergent categories as a single industry. 
If media policy objectives are in a state of flux, institutional 
framework for media regulation is also equally uncertain and 
fragmented. Regulatory authority is currently divided between 
several government departments even as the regulatory bills in-
cluding the much-acclaimed Communication Convergence Bill 
(2001) and the Broadcasting Service Regulation Bill (2007) are 
still far from realising their stated objective of introducing a com-
prehensive and coherent policy framework. It is thus one of the 
most crucial moments for media policy discussions to funnel 
their energy towards a meaningful debate, since, as Christian 
Sandvig rightly comments on internet architecture, “the unset-
tled character of today’s advanced communication systems is not 
our burden; it is our chance to act” (2006: 115). 
With a firm normative stance to enhance public interests 
rather than state or business interests, and backed with a clear 
understanding of the contradictory objectives underpinning 
c urrent regulatory frameworks, media policymakers should ur-
gently incorporate two important approaches. First is the recog-
nition of the changing technological landscape of media. Policy 
energy should be directed at comprehending and more fully 
i ncorporating the latest technological changes which have pushed 
the communications sector towards a functionally unbundled 
and modular form of organisation where communication func-
tions are distributed across different platforms through inter-
operable standards. These standards serve as a “connective tissue” 
which enables the devices and entities to perform different com-
munication functions in network architecture. In contrast, con-
tents, services and transmissions are yoked together in a single 
entity in a bundled architecture.
Media policy scholars are advocating a “layered approach” to 
media regulation to address and benefit from these latest changes 
in the communications sector. Since several entities can simulta-
neously take up or withdraw from communications services, a 
vertical orientation of regulating specific communications tech-
nologies through specific laws should give way for a horizontal 
orientation towards addressing different functional components 
of communications delivered through multiple entities and tech-
nologies. This implies that proprietary control and other regula-
tory issues should be verified at each functional layer of commu-
nications – most prominently content and physical infrastructure 
layers – since single entity need no longer deliver these two to-
gether. Second is the recognition of the intricate layers of control, 
ownership and media praxis which are driving rapid expansion of 
conventional as well as new media at the ground level. Thus, the 
broader policy approach should be simultaneously attentive to the 
technological changes and the ground realities of media organisa-
tion, a combination of technological, legal and anthropological 
insights into the nature and implications of media e xpansion. The 
three policy areas discussed in the subsequent sections serve to 
highlight the importance of such an approach. The focus is on the 
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news media and public service broadcasting since they are nor-
matively positioned to play a crucial role in democratic politics.
3 Mapping the Diversity of News Media Fields 
Any meaningful policy effort for the rapidly expanding news 
m edia in India should begin with the recognition that the structure 
and nature of news production is not uniform across the country. 
To consider the news media as a single entity in India would be a 
policy blunder, since there is vast diversity across different lan-
guages and regions. This diversity runs parallel to convergence 
tendencies at the technological level. An urgent task before the 
policymakers is to invest research energy to map these over-
lapping, yet distinct news fields within India. If in some states 
like Karnataka, the market dominance of national commercial 
news groups such as the Times of India (TOI) remains relatively 
uncontested in the last two decades, other news markets such as 
Tamil Nadu are structured firmly through political partisanship 
resulting from direct ownership of television news channels by 
political parties. Even more alarming is the concentration of car-
riage, content and transmission in a single entity owned by an 
influential political group. Sun Network, the largest broadcaster 
in the region, also controls local cable television transmission. In 
Karnataka, these trends of vertical integration are less visible in 
the electronic media but consolidation is evident in the print 
i ndustry since the Times group owns the largest circulated E nglish 
as well as Kannada (regional language) newspapers. 
To consider the case of Karnataka more closely, the recent ex-
pansion of the print media in the region is deeply interlaced with 
the rise of Bangalore as a “global city” and concomitant shifts in 
the urban landscape. Relaunching itself in 2007 in Bangalore, 
the TOI boosted its circulation and advertisement volumes 
through aggressive marketing strategies, price wars, polychro-
matic appeal, new forms of “reader-connect” programmes as well 
as city campaigns demanding better urban infrastructure for the 
corporate sector and middle class residents of the city. The rapid 
rise of the TOI on all market indicators pushed the existing play-
ers to defensively revisit their news policies, resulting in consid-
erable measure of mimesis across the news field in terms of 
l ayout designs, news themes as well as organisational practices 
of aligning the editorial team more closely with the marketing 
division. The daily cadences of editorial decisions came to rely on 
market research data on readership, often handed out by the 
same set of market research agencies for competing papers. This 
was at a time when the news organisations felt the pressure to 
adopt seemingly “systematic, impersonal and reliable ways” of 
mapping the readers in order to “institutionalise their quest” to 
comprehend them (Gitlin 1983: 31).
Bangalore’s rising status as a global city was important for the 
revised news agenda and organisational practices of the post-
1990s TOI and other newly launched English newspapers because 
the city appeared to have demonstrated what the private sector 
could achieve if the “obstructing state” retreated from its regula-
tory impositions. If, on the one hand, Bangalore emerged as a key 
destination for outsourced hi-tech and back-office work, on the 
other, the English media, especially the TOI, relied on the image of 
“successful” Bangalore to articulate and validate its pro-market 
discourse. Expanding on its market innovations in other news 
markets in the country, the TOI sensed the changes in Bangalore 
earlier than its competitors and was prescient in recognising the 
demographic shifts within the city resulting from its growing 
i mportance as a global outsourcing destination. Within a decade 
following the tech boom in the late 1980s, there was an influx of 
migrants from various parts of the country drawn to the high 
paying technology jobs of the global industry, as well as a new 
transnational class of returning diasporic tech workers within 
the city (Upadhya 2009). The TOI identified these migrants and 
“home-grown” hi-tech professionals as a new lucrative reader-
ship market, constituting a subculture distinct from the non-IT 
“native Bangaloreans”. In its efforts to target, serve and co- construct 
this new class of readers, the paper fuelled the discourse of a 
“new reader” by offering what I call the “new regimes of medi-
ated desire” as legitimate aspiration of the urban middle class. As 
a result, strong votaries of liberalisation such as the TOI continue 
to shape urban publics charged with “desire-as-aspiration”, in 
ways that “desire” itself extends beyond the realm of consumer 
commodities, into new imaginations of ideal citizenship, civic 
a ctivism, lifestyle, cultural ascent, social mobility, body and self.
The increasing commercialisation of the news media mediates 
desire-as-aspiration, since leading English newspapers such as 
the TOI seek to simultaneously expand commodity markets (ad-
vertisers) and their own readerships through innovative strate-
gies of connecting with the readers by relying on and cementing 
the ideologies of urban revival and urban boosterism. The global-
urban desires represented and co-created by the TOI’s revised 
strategies span the emblems of consumer modernity such as 
“Page 3” and luxury real estate as well as include new imagina-
tions of corporate leadership for the city. The ideological arsenal 
of corporate excellence, a decadent state and aspirational middle 
class underpins the revised news priorities and news practices of 
the paper. The organisational pedagogy of the new management 
and the English journalists’ own sense of victimhood at the hands 
of the postcolonial, “corrupt” state reinforced neo-liberal new-
speak in terms of legitimising the positive pole of the corporate 
and individual, and the negative pole of the state and public 
(Chakravartty and Udupa 2011). 
Despite the trends towards consolidation and neo-liberal new-
speak of the dominant news group, anthropological enquiry into 
the field of news practices reveals that commercial logic of ex-
pansion and profit aggrandisement advanced by many media 
groups comes into direct confrontation with a wide array of cul-
tural logics which are themselves set within the overarching ma-
trix of global and regional capital. Underwritten by a long history 
of “print communalism” in princely Mysore, the caste practices in 
the news field both build on and diverge from a distinct form of 
journalism which arose at the turn of the 20th century during the 
course of journalists’ active role in the non-brahmin movement 
(Udupa 2010). “Print communalism” referred to the print-mediated 
pan-caste and pan-religious non-brahmin struggle to procure 
greater political benefits for three elite non-brahmin groups: 
L ingayats, Vokkaligas and Muslims. Distinct from “print capital-
ism” (Anderson 1991), it entailed a relationship between a com-
munity-driven agenda and print which was fundamental in early 
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20th century Mysore (as with print and market in 19th century Eu-
rope). Shaped by this long and complex history of caste- journalism 
nexus, the news field in Karnataka is defined by caste-based prac-
tices at various levels of journalistic production, which draw on 
and feed into the larger caste-based political culture of the state. 
Among journalists and news proprietors, there are blurred bound-
aries between affective bonds, instrumental ties and professional 
networking. Often, these multiple strands converge in caste identi-
ties. Hence, jāti bala (caste-based strength), jāti samīkaraṇa (caste 
attraction) and jāti network (caste-based news networks) remain 
as interlinked aspects of journalistic s ociality perpetuated by, and 
perpetuating, caste-based allegiances. Brahmin-dominated Kan-
nada newspapers such as Kannada Prabha, Samyukta Karnataka 
and Vijaya Karnataka2 confront and seek to contest the pro- 
backward class voices of Prajavani, Vokkaliga mouthpiece such as 
Ee Sanje and the Lingayat lobbies traversing several news organisa-
tions. These power struggles render mediated visibility to several 
publics, while at the same time, excluding and eclipsing a range of 
structural and experiential questions around the marginalisation 
of dalits as well as critical issues that lie beyond the pragmatic and 
opportunistic networks of caste politics. 
Equally significant in the news dynamics are language-based 
solidarities which are reframed and revived in the context of on-
going liberalisation projects of the state. Within the field of news 
practices in the region, different grievances of multiple publics 
come to acquire meaning and intelligibility through the significa-
tion of Kannada. Because of its unstable nature, the figure of 
Kannada embraces a range of positions, values and meanings, 
which can at best be termed as a constantly mutating constella-
tion of meanings. This constellation of meanings and demands is 
largely forged in relation to the “expelled other”: English bour-
geois, global consumption and corporate sector interests, which 
have together acquired reasonable clarity under the strict edito-
rial directions of newspapers such as the TOI. As a result, overlap-
ping political, cultural, social and economic concerns of a hetero-
geneous group of news publics are increasingly expressed 
through Kannada, which serves as a partial empty-signifier 
( Laclau 2005). The partial embodiment of this signifier rests on the 
associated meanings of nāḍu-nuḍi-saṅskriti-samudāya (region-
language-culture-community) shaped and authenticated by Kan-
nada vāgmaya (linguistic ecumene). The unstable, fissured, yet 
effective forms of politics assembled through the logics of what I 
call the bhasha media confound modernist assumptions of ra-
tional critical public discourse, but nevertheless hold democratic 
potential for a range of publics, just as they equally efficiently 
curl back to reactionary cultural politics and fail to articulate a 
progressive alternative to the growing dominance of technocratic 
visions of the city, collusion between caste and capital, and mar-
ginalisation of the urban poor. Bhasha embodies the interlinked 
aspects of cultural distinctness, perceptions of temporal primacy, 
intimate address and inextricable connections with formal poli-
tics, which together have serious ramifications for the meanings 
assigned to Kannada by the journalistic community in the course 
of their interaction with language-based movements and caste 
politics in the state. Bhasha does not denote a realm severed from 
the larger ethos of market centrality, rather it is self-consciously 
set within the overarching context of urban transformation and 
consumer modernity, and defined by its organic links with the 
domain of formal politics. It embodies a “surplus of connota-
tions” (Pandian 1996: 3323),3 with its moments of subalternity in 
terms of giving voice to the subaltern-as-disenfranchised (Chat-
topadhyay and Sarkar 2005: 359),4 but overlaps also with elite 
politics based on caste and linguistic territoriality. 
Alongside the contradictory moves of the bhasha media, news 
channels owned by politician-businessmen have rapidly ex-
panded the presence of politically partisan news media in the 
r egion since many powerful politicians have forayed into the 
m edia and bought a stake in it. These include Janata Dal leader 
and former Chief Minister H D Kumaraswamy (Kasturi channel) 
and the Reddy brothers of the mining mafia (Janashree), to-
gether with a range of commercial media groups such as TV9. 
The multiple logics of the bhasha media and ownership patterns 
structuring the news field in Karnataka might not map out in the 
same way in other news markets in the country.
Party-Affiliated News Media
The rapid expansion of the news media in Andhra Pradesh, for 
example, is accompanied by explicit political partisanship and 
open advocacy of political interest groups. While the older news 
groups in the region had always relayed their partisan positions, 
the recent expansion of the news media is marked by direct forms 
of political party control and ownership. Such has been the influ-
ence of the newly launched party-affiliated news channels that 
the news field is today clearly demarcated along the political 
d ivide between the Congress I on the one hand, and a fragmented 
oppositional political field led by YSR Congress (of Jagan Mohan 
Reddy) and Telugu Desam Party (TDP) on the other. If the Eenadu 
news group has a long history of promoting anti-Congress poli-
tics, especially the TDP, the mandate before Sakshi, the newly 
launched media group by Jagan Mohan Reddy, is to contest the 
anti-Congress and pro-TDP bias in the existing news entities by 
providing the perspectives of Congress, and later the newly 
launched YSR Congress Party of Jagan. From the very beginning, 
Sakshi aimed to stay ahead of Eenadu on all counts – circulation, 
layout, technology and readership. Such heavy investments into 
newspapers and television channels, often unmindful of com-
mercial returns, reveal the deeply politicised intentions fuelling 
news media expansion in the region. A commentator piquantly 
remarked that the news proprietors in Andhra Pradesh are “ either 
politicians, prospective politicians or politicians by hobby”. 
The rivalry between various news proprietors is underwritten by 
the Kamma-Reddy caste divide which shapes the wider field 
of Andhra politics. “Namaste Telangana” and “T-News”, the two 
r ecent entrants into the news field, are the media outlets for the 
 Telangana movement, which have deepened a revived axis of con-
flict within the partisan press. The close association between formal 
politics and local cinema adds yet another dynamic to the news 
field. These forces together animate the complex triangulated axis 
of power comprising caste leaders, cinema stars and news proprie-
tors. The practical moorings of news production are thus anchored 
to the particular, at times shifting, political prio rities of the news 
proprietors and their strategies of political m anoeuvring. 
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Simultaneously, all the major newspapers, and to a lesser ex-
tent news channels, give a daily combination of a variety of news 
themes and political news with diverse perspectives, eluding the 
delegitimising label of a “party mouthpiece”. At times, caste-
based allegiances too are obscured within the news field since 
caste leaders of Kammas and Reddys populate both Congress and 
TDP in varying measures. The blurring of caste loyalties for self-
serving political interests has occurred alongside rapid commer-
cialisation of the news media and large investments into tele-
vision channels, often by diverting the capital from other business 
ventures. The blunting of political partisan positions is hence 
e ffected by the expanding business interests of various news 
groups. As a pivotal case, Deccan Chronicle and its sister publica-
tion in Telugu (Andhra Bhoomi), commonly perceived as a highly 
commercial news group, manoeuvres its political position to en-
hance and safeguard its burgeoning business interests in a range 
of enterprises. The news group treads a more ambiguous, if not 
neutral, political position, since they have rapidly expanded into 
new areas of business including the ownership of a private cricket 
league in India – the Indian Premier League (IPL). If the Deccan 
Chronicle group provides a striking case of collusion between 
business interests, media capital and strategic political alliances, 
the owners of other prominent news groups in Andhra also have 
wide business interests including ventures in information techno-
logy, consumer products, chit funds, private cricket teams, ho-
tels, film production, real estate, cement, as well as active role in 
regional politics – a trend reflective of the longer history of “print 
capitalism”, as Robin Jeffrey (2000) has convincingly argued. 
This brief discussion of Andhra and Karnataka reveals that 
there are many overlaps between caste-politics, cinema-business 
nexus underpinning media expansion in all the four southern 
states, including Tamil Nadu and Kerala. But there are also im-
portant divergences in the region and across the country, owing 
to distinct histories of language, capital formation and notions of 
territory. These structural factors, especially the patterns of owner-
ship and nature of capital flow into the media sector as well as 
the ideologies of market-led growth deeply influence news praxis 
and their potential to advance democratic participation. There is 
a rich literature to compare news systems across different n ations 
and transnational regions, such as Hallin and Mancini’s (2007) 
pioneering work on different models of journalism existing in 
North America, continental Europe and Mediterranean coun-
tries. Similar exercise in mapping the news fields within India 
will benefit policymakers to at once address multiple loyalties 
structuring the news field and differences in patterns of control, 
ownership and media practices. While specific policy recommen-
dations can only emerge after such a detailed analysis of the 
m edia fields, the discussion of the two states strongly suggests 
that the broader policy approach should consider media as varie-
gated and not limited even to the frequently invoked distinction 
between the English and vernacular media. 
4 Modular Approach to Public Service Media
More importantly, the rhizomic existence of heterogeneous news 
practices in the commercial sector call for a robust public service 
media and innovative forms of state and community interventions. 
The landmark judgment of the Supreme Court of India in 1995 set 
a new paradigm by stating that the airwaves are “public prop-
erty” and therefore, freedom of the press should be understood 
not merely as freedom of media enterprises to engage in their 
businesses, but a substantive right of the public to have access to 
avenues of expression and public debate. The right to expression 
has to be approached comprehensively as the right to be heard as 
well as right to say and hear. This important judgment pushed 
the regulatory debates beyond the dichotomy of the regulating 
state and free media by emphasising the need to protect diversity 
and public interests in media production. However, the crucial 
public media thrust of the judgment was obscured by the private 
sector-led interpretations, which presented it as the judiciary’s 
call for ending state monopoly of broadcasting to allow private 
players into the sector (Parthasarathi 2010). 
In this context, policy approaches to public service media 
should be charged both by ideological contestations as well as 
technological innovations. Although important, top-down regu-
lation based on the assumption of bundled communications 
a rchitecture is not sufficient to create a vibrant, inclusive and ref-
lective media ecosystem. Recognition of the functionally unbun-
dled nature of communications architecture was evident in the 
Convergence Bill (2001). However, the broad policy objective 
u nderpinning the bill was still anchored to the raison d’être of 
media control through a centralised authority rather than to the 
wider objective of leveraging the benefits of network architecture 
of advanced communications for democratic practice. 
In their recommendations to the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) in the US, Ellen Goldman and Anne Chen (2010) 
proposed a comprehensive plan to revive public service broad-
casting precisely through a modular and unbundled approach to 
media. These recommendations have pushed the l ayered model 
of regulation beyond the rationale of state control to instead help 
policymakers to design innovative environments for public 
m edia interventions. While several of their recommendations are 
rooted in the American experience of rapid digitisation and 
s everal more are aspirational even by the standards of developed 
countries, some lessons can be drawn for the Indian context. For 
instance, while many readers are cognisant of the growing phe-
nomenon of paid news, it is still difficult to discriminate a large 
crop of paid content from non-paid news content in the main-
stream news media. Nor is it apparent even for the most discern-
ing audience if a news story is tied to covert and overt forms of 
product placements and political partisanship. Content regula-
tion through a co-regulatory model can address this problem in 
some measure, but more effective would be the efforts to connect 
and re-energise a wide array of state and community networks of 
information sharing, which have always been a mainstay for de-
centralised governance. The government should focus its policy 
energy to revive the extensive public service broadcasting facili-
ties and other state-supported institutions already available in 
the country to enhance the capacity of communities to reflect on 
and engage mainstream commercial media. Although Prasar 
Bharati (the Broadcasting Corporation of India) is vested with 
many of the lofty ideals of public media, it has still remained an 
object of political gambit for successive governments. 
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  january 28, 2012 vol xlviI no 4 107
In this context, Goldman and Chen’s application of layered 
model of regulation for public service broadcasting throws fresh 
insights into ways of recharging and reaffirming our public 
m edia objectives. Using the layered and network architecture of 
internet, they propose that different streams of communications 
engaged in public service media should be connected, scaled up, 
curated and transmitted through the available and revived facili-
ties of public service media. They contend that the state should 
move away from considering television and radio as the sole 
r ecipients of state support. Instead, public service media should 
e ncompass a wider range of content providers and information 
activists through a decentralised mechanism that addresses all 
the four layers – physical infrastructure, connection (between 
various platforms engaged in public service media), curation 
(supporting content and services of public value) and creation 
(creating content which the market insufficiently or erroneously 
addresses). 
While the current structure of Prasar Bharati firmly holds the 
physical infrastructure layer, policy innovations in connecting 
and curating non-commercial and community media in a net-
work model are yet to be charted in generative ways. Content 
creation and curation are instead left to the vagaries of political 
interventions and the troubling limitations of bureaucratic a ction. 
Underpinning many efforts of the corporation is the deep-seated 
policy assumption around state pedagogy via technology – an 
a ssumption that dates back to the techno-optimism shared by 
diffusion theorists and the newly empowered technocrats of 
N ehruvian India charged with development goals. As Ashish 
R ajadhyaksha5 (2009) has rightly argued, this approach col-
lapsed technological solution to the “last mile” problem with 
democratic growth, alongside favouring the broadcast model. 
This came at the cost of overlooking a limited number of success 
stories of participatory communication evident even within the 
realms of conventional media. 
There are many platforms available today to generate useful 
public media content and practices – community radio, non- 
governmental organisations, innovative news portals, anti-corruption 
civil society watchdogs, public ombudsman and activist groups 
comprising several villages at sub-regional levels under various 
cultural and language-based political repertoires. While these 
diverse entities cannot be clubbed into a single category, nor can 
their motivations be a ssumed as uniformly innocent, Prasar 
Bharati should connect useful public service media functions 
available across these channels in a network model of content ag-
gregation and curation. The corporation should actively connect, 
curate and scale up these networks in a multilateral way, instead 
of relying only on the hub-spoke model of connecting national 
broadcast s tations with regional stations. For instance, several 
non-media actors have worked laboriously to generate vital infor-
mation on the vexed issue of mining in Karnataka, which could 
be connected with similar insights across India, such that specific 
theme-based information portals and media practices are scaled 
up and made available for the larger public as well as for the 
p olitical-bureaucratic machinery. This involves a deeper ideo-
logical shift from technology-led state pedagogy to a network 
model of communication and community building. 
Another institutional site needing a similar makeover is the 
press academies instituted in several states in India to promote 
sound journalism. In contrast to Prasar Bharati, these are much 
smaller but have the advantage of engaging journalists and con-
ventional media actors locally, often at intimate levels of address. 
The Press Academy in Karnataka rechristened itself as Karnataka 
Media Academy to involve the growing tribe of television jour-
nalists. The name change notwithstanding, these academies nei-
ther have the financial strength nor technical expertise to engage 
a growing community of content and information activists who 
have been using a wide range of platforms including local news-
letters, community radio, online portals and mobile phones. 
Doordarshan, AIR, Media Academy, professional media associa-
tions drawing state support (however minimal) as well as non-
media information activists should form part of a larger network 
of public service media in which various streams of non-commer-
cial content are linked and curated to maximise their effect, 
reach and appeal. 
5 Regulatory Models
If the “productive” side of content regulation call for new imagi-
nations, the “restrictive” dimensions of content regulation need 
an equally rigorous reassessment. The three regulatory models 
widely discussed in the international forums relate to the options 
of state-led regulatory mechanism, self-regulation or co-regula-
tion. The merits and demerits of each regulatory model and their 
specific regulatory structures have been extensively discussed 
within other national contexts including the US, Germany, Aus-
tralia, Spain and the United Kingdom. In the state-led regulatory 
model, all regulatory activities spanning from rule making 
(drawing the code of ethics and professional rules) and imple-
mentation to supervision and sanctioning (incentives/punitive 
measures) are vested with the state authorities. While this en-
sures compliance through strict statutory institutions and proc-
esses, the dangers of command-control model of state regulation 
in the Indian context cannot be overstated. There have been sev-
eral instances lately to hold evidence that state interventions spe-
cifically target dissenting voices. If the National Emergency in 
1975 was the most severe of state-imposed restrictions on the 
press, there have also been several other measures by national 
and regional governments to have a blanket-ban approach to cer-
tain regulatory concerns. An important case is the enactment of 
Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Commu-
nal Offenders Act, 1984. After retaining all the provisions of the 
National Security Act, 1980, the Andhra Pradesh bill also in-
cluded specific provisions related to the press (Shatrugna 1984). 
These provisions gave the government the power to close down 
any printing press involved in publishing articles dubbed as 
“communal writings”. A more recent legal attempt to impose 
r estrictions on the media relate to Chhattisgarh Special Public 
Security Act (2005) which provides provisions to bar the media 
from reporting any activities considered by the state as “unlawful 
activities”, primarily targeting Maoist dissent in the region. 
Splintered across different regions and justified on the grounds 
of specific regional “problems”, such legal provisions continue to 
evade concerted nationwide debate. Any formalised mechanism 
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to implement state regulation of the media bears the risk of further 
cementing the restrictive tenor of regulation, not to speak of the 
dangers entailed in indiscrete use of regulatory provisions by 
b ureaucrats as well as multifarious forms of political interventions. 
As an alternative model, self-regulation holds out the promise 
of greater compliance for content code and ethics of conduct 
through mechanisms of peer surveillance. To avert possible gov-
ernment interventions, the News Broadcasters Association (NBA), 
a professional association for private news broadcasters, has drawn 
a code of ethics and has also set up News Broadcasting Standards 
Disputes Redressal Authority comprising 14 members representing 
30 news channels. While these measures ensured considerable re-
straint in the coverage of Ayodhya verdict, at least among a section 
of private news broadcasters, the practicalities of everyday media 
production and intense competition and m imesis within the media 
field suggest that the professional guidelines drawn up by self-reg-
ulatory bodies are most likely to remain as sacred tenets of the holy 
cow that no one read or followed. A recent incident involving vio-
lation of professional guidelines by a private news broadcaster re-
veals the inadequacies of self-regulatory mechanism. When NBA 
imposed its disciplinary measures on the erring channel and asked 
the channel to telecast the compulsory scroll of apology for the 
mistake, the channel quickly withdrew its membership from the 
association. In such cases of non-compliance among wilful trans-
gressors, self-regulatory model has little choice to ensure compli-
ance. At the same time, this regulatory model bears the risk of frag-
mentation and lack of legitimacy. 
More importantly, the structural issues of ownership and con-
solidation can hardly be addressed by a self-regulatory model. 
The rapid expansion of media and advertising sector is facilitated 
and accompanied by extensive financial restructuring of the 
m edia sector. In recent years, the sector has become more aligned 
with, and dependent on, private equity holders, foreign direct 
i nvestment and share markets (Kohli-Khandekar 2006) even as 
the ownership structure of the media reveals the continued 
d ominance of “individual owners”. Following the trend which be-
gan during the colonial years, regional and national capitalists 
continue to invest in the media as part of the larger agenda to 
a dvance their business and political interests (Jeffrey 2000; Nair 
2003). According to the Ministry of Information and Broadcast-
ing, newspapers owned by “individuals” still enjoy 53% of the 
t otal circulation in India, followed by joint stock companies 
(39%); trusts (2.9%); societies/associations (2.4%); and firms/
partnerships (2%).6 Cross-ownership and economic consolida-
tion have become more complex in the recent years since many 
news entities are part of the large family-owned business houses in 
India and several more new entrants are linked to new political-
economic elites emerging along the murky networks of global 
capital and local power within particular regions in the country. 
Whereas there are signs of vertical integration, but less consoli-
dation at the national level,7 regional media markets reveal a dif-
ferent story. In an extensive quantitative survey of the multi-
lingual news market in India, Chandrasekhar and Ghosh8 point 
to growing concentration within specific regional language news 
markets of India, especially those which have large circulation 
volumes: “Underlying the diversity and disparity implicit in the 
segmented markets created by language is a basic tendency to-
wards concentration in larger markets among those languages. 
Overall, barring an exception like Hindi, a larger circulation is 
accompanied by greater dominance.” Similarly, the annual m edia 
industry report prepared by the Federation of Indian Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and KPMG (2009) has found 
that in almost every major language segment and in most states 
three dominant players together control between 65% and 75% 
of the news market.
Conceiving a Co-Regulatory Model
A finely crafted co-regulatory model can provide an effective 
regulatory mechanism to address content issues as well as the 
most fiercely debated issues concerning ownership and carriage. 
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The experiences of regulatory authorities of several countries in 
imposing restrictions on cross-holdings and consolidation provide 
a sober reminder of the inadequacies of the existing regulatory 
bodies. A pivotal case is the well-established regulatory authority 
of the UK, OfCom, which has silently absolved itself from the re-
sponsibility of imposing restrictions on cross-ownership, bowing 
to corporate pressure. Simultaneously, it has increasingly lent its 
departments for market-friendly research, including the much 
hyped “hyperlocal media” promising business models for local 
media entities at neighbourhood levels. However, FCC, O fCom, 
Australian Communications and Media Authority and other regu-
latory bodies have been active in experimenting several models to 
allocate regulatory functions to public as well as private entities. 
Many of the reasonably successful efforts in regulation in these 
countries have adopted a co-regulatory model involving distribu-
tion of regulatory functions between public and private players. 
Co-regulatory model can be conceived in two ways: distri-
bution of regulatory functions in a single regulatory strand (e g, 
drafting of content code as opposed to enforcement of content 
code), and distribution of different aspects of regulation (e g, 
ownership as opposed to content) between private players and 
public authorities (usually independent statutory body). For in-
stance, there are certain in-built incentives evolved by the indus-
try and the monitoring mechanisms of FCC to ensure diversity in 
content and representation of minority voices. Similarly, in Ger-
many, co-regulatory models retain the state’s regulatory power 
through certification of code and non-state regulatory bodies 
while allowing sufficient institutional space for the industry 
a ssociations to administer and monitor regulation. These 
 approaches have been particularly successful for minor protec-
tion in audio-visual services. As Wolfgang Schulz, media regula-
tion scholar emphasises, effective regulatory structure entails a 
fine balance between regulatory power of the state and incen-
tives built in the self-regulatory models. Since self-regulation can 
assure greater degree of flexibility and active industry involve-
ment, the industry should lead the first layer of regulatory mech-
anism – especially drawing content code and guidelines for ethi-
cal m edia practices as well as their monitoring. However, these 
layers should be legally linked to an autonomous statutory body 
with clear processes for escalation of complaints and findings. 
The a utonomous statutory body should have provisions of sanc-
tions after exhausting industry-led mechanisms of restraint and 
i ncentives. It should also intervene in specific forms of productive 
regulation of content and include a modular approach to regulat-
ing ownership, consolidation and other structural issues, as dis-
cussed in the second section. At the same time, there should be 
other innovative ways of encouraging compliance – publication 
of outcomes of compliance, publicity to regulatory mechanisms, 
and a discursive turnaround media regulation to emphasise the 
positive aspects of regulation that could prompt media entities 
and media professionals to approach regulation as ways to en-
hance the trustworthiness of brands. Even before any of this is 
set in motion, the government should have sufficient data and 
insights on different media fields and patterns of media practices 
within the country, as pointed out in the third section. If the 
b urden appears huge today, it will only escalate with the rapidly 
multiplying and even more rapidly mutating media landscape 
of tomorrow. 
Notes
1   Kate Oakley (2004), “Developing the Evidence 
Base for Support of Cultural and Creative Activi-
ties in South East England”, http://www.semlac.
org.uk/docs/Oakley%20Report%2012.4.04.pdf, 
accessed on 5 October 2008. 
2   Vijaya Karnataka, owned by Lingayat business-
man and politician Vijaya Sankeshwara had a 
strong presence of brahmin journalists at all edi-
torial levels. The paper underwent significant 
transformation after the TOI group acquired 
V ijayanand Publishers in 2006. There were more 
advertisement-friendly news features and paid 
content in the newspaper in the later years of ac-
quisition, and a thorough restructuring of the edi-
torial team. 
3   Pandian himself does not use the term bhasha.
4   This builds on Chattopadhyay and Sarkar’s invita-
tion to examine the effects of “relaxing the Gram-
scian assumption that the subaltern is defined by 
insufficient access to modes of representation”, 
and how this can redefine our theoretical practice 
and empirical investigation (2005: 359).
5   Ashish Rajadhyaksha (2009), “A Provisional Defi-
nition for the Cultural Last Mile”, http://www.
cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/
blogs/rethinking-the-last-mile-problem/defini-
ton/, accessed on 5 July 2011. 
6   Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Gov-
ernment of India Report 2005. Sourced from 
www.indiastat.com, accessed 20 March 2009.
7   Vibodh Parthasarathi, “Media under Corporate 
Control”, Combat Law, www.combatlaw.org, 
pp 31-36. 
8   C P Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh (2003), “On 
the Economics of Media Diversity”, Macroscan, 
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